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The Syrian Civil War gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since
the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. The crisis evidenced the deficiencies of the
European Union Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian
refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. We draw on
previous theoretical work to simulate how a system of tradable refugee-admission
quotas coupled with a matching mechanism assigning refugees to their preferred
destinations and destinations to their preferred types of refugees would give more
flexibility to Member States while respecting refugee rights and preferences.
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“Nine member states in the EU today receive 90% of all asylum applications
annually, but those nine states are starting to, well, become fed up.”
(Tobias Billström, Sweden’s Immigration Minister, 3 March 2014)
‘This worst humanitarian crisis of our era should be galvanizing a global outcry of
support, but instead help is dwindling. With humanitarian appeals systematically
underfunded, there just isn’t enough aid to meet the colossal needs—nor enough
development support to the hosting countries creaking under the strain of so many
refugees.” (António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 12 March 2015)
UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres referred to the Syrian refugee
crisis as the “worst humanitarian crisis of our era,” with almost 4 million Syrians concen-
trated in refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt in bleak conditions at
the beginning of 2015.1 A year earlier, Tobias Billström, Sweden’s Immigration Minister,
complained that most asylum applications in the European Union were handled by only
nine countries, his own included, an asymmetry that was leading even the most welcoming
countries in Europe to reconsider their willingness to help.2015 Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
reative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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institutions dealing with refugees and asylum seekers under heavy pressure to reform.
The emergency humanitarian situation and the sheer volumes involved acted as
stress-tests for the “Common European Asylum System” (CEAS). It is only fair to say
that, by and large, the system was unable to provide appropriate responses to the new
situation. In Guterres’ words: “If we fail to provide adequate support to refugees and
their hosts, and to build up their resilience to cope with the long-term pressures of
this increasingly protracted refugee situation, we risk a further destabilization of the
entire region.”2 Sadly enough, the CEAS remained largely virtual for a long time,
prompting strong criticism of its legal framework (see De Bruycker et al., 2010); at
the same time, the pressure to “do something” generated frantic policy experimenta-
tion, with a succession of spectacular but often short-lived initiatives, such as the
“Mare Nostrum” operation (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014; Fargues and Di Bartolomeo, 2015).
In May 2015, the European Union launched the new European Agenda on Migration
(European Commission, 2015a). The Agenda called for triggering, for the first time, the
“emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) TFEU,” including “a
temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection to
ensure a fair and balanced participation of all Member States to this common effort”.
This paper goes two steps beyond the European Agenda on Migration with a pro-
posal on how to coordinate policy responses across Member States in response to refu-
gee crisis. Our proposal builds on well-established models in public economics
(markets for tradable quotas) and on recent theoretical contributions in the field of
mechanism design (the “matching” component in what follows). These tools have been
successfully applied to issues as diverse as pollution, kidney transplants, or to the allo-
cation of students to schools, colleges and hospitals. With some adaptation, they can
also be applied to improve the EU’s asylum and refugee-admission policy in terms both
of efficiency and equity.
The system would have two key elements: the market for refugee-admission
quotas and the matching mechanism. In the market, countries would trade quotas
previously assigned according to an allocation key like the one proposed in the
European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a). This would make
sure that countries more willing to host refugees would welcome more of them
and be compensated for doing so by countries less willing to host refugees. The
second element, the matching mechanism, is needed in order to make sure that
refugee rights are respected at all times. In particular, it guarantees that no refugee
is forced to go to an undesired destination. In addition, it generates further effi-
ciency gains by allowing refugees to choose their preferred destinations and coun-
tries their preferred, if any, types of refugees.
The full model was developed in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
(2014) and adapted to the EU Asylum Policy in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2015). This paper shows how such a system could work in the context
of the Syrian refugee crisis. We first describe the theory behind the proposed sys-
tem and then proceed to simulate the market side of the proposal under different
parameterizations. We conclude with a summary of the main insights from our
analysis and by discussing the need for experimentation before undertaking major
reforms of the CEAS.
Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:23 Page 3 of 132 The proposal
In earlier work (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport, 2015), we set out a “tradable
refugee-admission quotas (TRAQs) system with matching” in four steps. The first one
is borrowed from earlier proposals, including the European Agenda on Migration.
Numbers 2 and 3 refer to our proposal proper, while number 4 just relates it to existing
policies, as reflected in an EU pilot project.
2.1 The distribution Key
First, we start by documenting the general recognition in both academic and policy circles
for the need to reform the CEAS and the need to structure EU asylum policy reform
around a number of core legal and institutional principles; first among them is the notion
of solidarity, both internal (sharing responsibility among EU member countries) and
external (providing refugee protection to those who most deserve it). Regarding
“responsibility-sharing” (often improperly referred to by the less politically-correct
term “burden-sharing”), we recall the findings of studies (notably Hatton, 2012, and
Thielemann et al., 2010) trying to assess the fair share of refugees and asylum seekers each
EU country should take according to its “capacity.” For example, Thielemann et al. (2010)
suggest that based on an “equal burden sharing rule” (assessed by a “combined capacity
index”), more than one third of the asylum seekers that were present within the EU
borders in 2010 should have been transferred to other countries within the EU. Wagner
and Kraler (2014) compare up to seven different quota distribution rules that have either
been proposed or implemented within countries. Their implications in terms of the share
of asylum seekers that should be allocated to each EU Member State are shown in Fig. 1:
The rules are the following:
1. SWP Model: 40 percent economic strength (GDP), 40 percent population size,
10 percent geographic area and 10 percent unemployment rate.
2. German Proposal 1994: one-third population size, one-third geographic area and
one-third economic strength (GDP).Fig. 1 Chart 1 from Wagner and Kraler (2014). Refugee quotas resulting from seven different distribution
keys described in the text
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share in total tax revenue.
4. Austrian Model for internal dispersal: population size.
5. Share of EU GDP or economic strength.
6. Mean Asylum Applications in 2009–2013.
7. European Refugee Fund distribution key: 30 percent based on number of beneficiaries
of international protection admitted in the last three years and 70 percent based on
number of applicants for international protection admitted in the last three years.
Figure 1 shows that rules 1 to 4 give rise to similar distributions of quotas, based
mostly on economic strength and population, which are typically highly correlated.
Rules 6 and 7 are a bit different as long as they are based on actual applications and
refugees accepted by the countries. In this sense, they can be seen as having an inertia
component, which can alternatively be interpreted as either maintaining the status quo
or else as reflecting revealed preferences on the part of Member States.
The European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a) introduced
an eighth distribution key with the following components (European Commission,
2015b): a) the size of the population (40% weighting), b) the total of the GDP
(40% weighting), c) the average number of spontaneous asylum applications and
the number of resettled refugees per one million inhabitants over the period 2010–
2014 (10% weighting) and d) the unemployment rate (10% weighting). Hence, it is
basically a replication of rule number 1 that substitutes the geographical area elem-
ent with something similar to rules 6 and 7, although used in the opposite direc-
tion. Rather than to ensure some inertia, the inclusion of the previous number of
resettled refugees aims at relieving the efforts of those countries that received more
refugees in the past.
Next, we detail the two components of our proposed mechanism, which are
borrowed from the broader scheme developed in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2014).2.2 The market for tradable refugee-admission quotas
The first component is the tradable quotas system. Its principle is to determine a total
number of asylum seekers/refugees to be hosted by the EU and a distribution of initial
quotas across countries. We are agnostic with respect to the total number and the ini-
tial allocation, which could be done according to any of the eight rules mentioned
above. These issues must be addressed in any solidarity mechanism, not just ours. The
advantage of a tradable quotas system, however, is that it allows for revealing informa-
tion on the true costs of accommodating refugees in the participating countries, and it
allows (actually, forces) countries to exploit their comparative advantages in either
“hosting” or “funding.” In other words, there are two ways by which countries can con-
tribute to the public good of the “international protection of refugees:” through visas or
through money. The market for admissions will allocate refugees so that the marginal
cost of hosting them is equalized across destinations. The solution is efficient in that it
minimizes the total cost (or, for a given total cost, allows for the accommodation of
more refugees).
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there must be large cross-country differences in the costs of admitting refugees
and asylum seekers. This will be more likely the case if countries are more dissimi-
lar in their assessments of how “costly” refugees’ admissions are (which in turn de-
pends on how dissimilar they are in terms of economic performance, demographic
structure, intrinsic preferences for diversity and cultural proximity, and any other
dimension affecting the actual and perceived costs of hosting refugees). Finally, it
is also important to assess the extent to which the EU Member States are opened to
financial compensations among them as potential solidarity mechanisms. Thielemann
et al. (2010) suggests that financial compensation is among the preferred mechanisms
(together with information sharing and joint capacity-building) to put solidarity in the
field of asylum policy into practice.2.3 The matching mechanism
The second component is the matching mechanism, whereby each candidate refugee
(e.g., an asylum seeker or a refugee applying for resettlement within the EU) is asked to
rank his or her preferred destinations. This means that they would prefer to be
resettled in that destination (or have their asylum request examined there) rather than
remaining in their current situation. Under no circumstance would a refugee or asylum
seeker be forced to go to an undesired destination.
There are several matching mechanisms that could be compatible with our scheme.
For example, we could have a one-sided matching mechanism in which only refugees
and asylum seekers would express their preferences about their preferred destinations,
while destination countries would have no say. In that case, candidate refugees would
be ranked in a random order, with the first in line granted their first choice, the second
in line their first choice, etc., until we have to go down the list as preferred destinations
gradually fill up. This is known as the top trading cycles mechanism, which would be
equivalent to a random serial dictatorship (the first in the line “dictates”). This mechanism
is typically used for allocating students to housing units in a campus (Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez, 1999).
However, the matching mechanism does not need to limit the choices of the re-
ceiving countries. EU hosting countries could also express their preferences, this
time vis-à-vis the “type” of refugees they would like to host. For example, countries
could express preferences according to the skill or education level of the refugees,
their nationality, family status, or legal status (e.g., asylum-seekers vs. refugees ap-
plying for resettlement). This is done by “bidding” for certain types as part of the
country’s quota. If all countries have the same preferences, the result will be
equivalent to a case where they are indifferent with respect to refugee type. If
countries have diverging preferences, then allowing them to express these prefer-
ences will reduce the expected cost of the system.
Matching mechanisms in which both refugees and Member States could state their
preferences are typically used to assign students to schools or colleges. Several mecha-
nisms would be feasible, such as the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechan-
ism. Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 2015) recommend the country-
proposing deferred acceptance mechanism by which countries would first propose visas
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rounds. In practice, the mechanism simply requires collecting the preferences of both
countries and refugees or asylum seekers. These preferences would take the form of a
ranking of preferred destinations for refugees, in particular stating clearly which coun-
tries they would be unwilling to move to at all, and a ranking of preferred types of refu-
gees for hosting Member States. The algorithm for the mechanism can then be
programed and run in a centralized way, and the solution would be exactly the same as
the solution to the game of proposals and counter-proposals.2.4 Comparing our proposal to existing policies: the EUREMA case
Overall, the combination of these two elements—the tradable quotas system and the
matching mechanism—results in a policy tool that has lots of theoretical advantages: cost-
efficiency, incentive compatibility,3 and fairness in cost-sharing and in refugees’ allocation.
Could it work in the real world? To try to assess this, Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2015) concluded with a discussion of the properties of the proposed tool against
the background of the EUREMA (European Relocation from Malta) Program. This pro-
gram took place in 2011–12 and allowed for the relocation of about 500 refugees and asy-
lum seekers in 15 participating countries. The selection of potential beneficiaries that were
relocated was made in two steps: UNHCR first stepped in through a registration exercise,
and then participating countries sent missions to Malta to make the final selection.
Importantly, from our perspective, the program was evaluated by the European Asylum
Support Office (European Asylum Support Office, 2012). The evaluation report reveals
important information about the conception and execution of the program. First, it is
clear that substantial attention was paid to the selection criteria and demands emanating
from participating countries, but candidate refugees’ preferences about destinations were
largely neglected. This led to long delays, frictions and inefficiency.
Second, the report listed a series of problems identified by the participating countries
including: delays in the identification of candidate refugees genuinely interested in re-
location; lack of overlap between the participating states’ selection criteria and refugee
profiles; troubles in assessing the willingness and suitability of potential beneficiaries to
being relocated; unclear criteria concerning relatives and family reunification4; and lack
of will by some candidates to commit to relocation offers by new EU Member States
where there are few migrant communities.
As explained above, a tradable quotas system (with a matching mechanism) is precisely
designed to address these problems. Following the publication of the new European
Agenda on Migration, we therefore examine below how our proposal could be imple-
mented in the quantitatively much bigger (and, arguably, politically much more sensitive)
context on the Syrian refugee crisis.3 Simulations
This section simulates the policy proposal described above under different scenarios re-
lated to the Syrian refugee crisis. The functional forms and main assumptions of the
calculations we present are taken from Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
(2014), who simulated an extension of the US diversity visa lottery to the OECD under
a similar mechanism.
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In particular, the cost function for country i of hosting ri new Syrian refugees that we
use in the simulations below is the following:
ci rið Þ ¼ γi2
r2i
popi
The country cost ci(ri) depends convexly on the number of refugees ri hosted, on the
total population of the country popi and on the country-specific parameter γi. The par-
ameter γi can be interpreted as the degree of aversion for an individual country i to
hosting additional Syrian refugees. An advantage of this formulation is the possibility of
writing the marginal cost as a linear function of the share of incoming refugees over
the total population:
c0i rið Þ ¼ γ i
ri
popi
The remaining main ingredients of our proposal are the following:
– A total number of refugees to be resettled. In order to focus on the mechanics of
the system, we confine ourselves to the little more than 40,000 Syrian refugees to
be resettled pledged by EU Member States5 at the beginning of 2015. Alternatively,
we could use three more ambitious proposals by François Crépeau, UN Special
Rapporteur on migrant rights, Amnesty International and UNHCR,6 ranging
between 130,000 and 200,000 refugees, or the one established by the European
Agenda on Migration for relocating 40,000 arrivals in Greece and Italy to the rest
of the European Union and resettling 20,000 refugees from third countries across
all Member States (European Commission, 2015a). Since we are focusing on the
Syrian crisis, we prefer to perform the simulations with the data that were referred
exclusively to Syria.
– An initial distribution of quotas across countries before trading. We follow the
eighth distribution key introduced in the previous section, that is, the one proposed
in the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b).
– Preferences for refugee admissions. Following Fernández-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2014), we use both survey results on the willingness of natives to host
additional refugees and revealed preferences, that is, the actual number of Syrian
refugees pledged by European countries. The survey data correspond to the share of
people in the Special Eurobarometer 380 from 2011 disagreeing with the statement:
“The EU Member States should offer protection and asylum to people in need”.
– A monetary reference on the cost of hosting refugees. We need a number to
translate our model equations into euros. We use the per refugee quantity that the
Asylum and Migration Fund provides EU member states with whenever they host
an additional refugee, that is, 6000 to 10,000 euros.7 We focus on the upper bound
of 10,000 euros.
For the sake of brevity, we only present fully here two of the many simulations that
we have performed. The rest, in particular those with different distribution keys, are
available upon request.
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Table 1 presents our first simulation. We only consider Member States who had actu-
ally pledged to host Syrian refugees as of April 2015. These Member States account for
85 percent of the total quotas assigned by the European Commission (2015a) for re-
settlement from third countries. The actual pledges are shown in the first data column.
The second shows a distribution of quotas following the European Commission pro-
posal for resettlement from third countries rescaled for the omission of non-pledging
countries. We can see that there are countries such as Germany, Sweden, Austria and
Finland pledging to host more Syrian refugees than the EU proposal would suggest,
while all the rest, notably the UK, Italy or Spain, pledge to host much fewer refugees
than implied by the European Commission.
Suppose countries were assigned, by our mechanism, the quotas suggested by column
2 (on the basis of the EU resettlement proposal), what are the intrinsic preferences on
refugee arrivals that could generate the actual observed pledges? This question is an-
swered in column 3. The column gives us a measure of the anti-refugee sentiment of
the Member States (in proportion to their population). For example, the UK, Poland
and Spain, in such a market, would have revealed themselves as the countries disliking
refugees the most. On the contrary, Germany, Sweden and Austria would be revealedTable 1 Simulation under revealed preferences: preferences are such that the market arrives at the
actual number of pledges













Austria 1,500 1,047 56 1,500 19% 60%
Belgium 300 1,156 372 300 55% −570%
Czech Republic 70 1,238 1502 70 89% −3337%
Denmark 390 814 144 390 27% −217%
Finland 850 691 64 850 5% 37%
France 2,400 5,601 273 2,400 33% −267%
Germany 30,000 7,277 27 30,000 975% 151%
Hungary 30 724 3303 30 92% −4627%
Ireland 421 641 109 421 12% −105%
Italy 450 4,691 1326 450 82% −1885%
Luxembourg 60 347 90 60 68% −956%
Netherlands 500 1,726 336 500 50% −490%
Poland 100 2,269 3806 100 91% −4337%
Portugal 93 1,660 1128 93 89% −3370%
Spain 130 3,653 3594 130 93% −5420%
Sweden 2,700 1,158 35 2,700 177% 114%
United Kingdom 143 5,445 4469 143 95% −7416%
Total 40,137 40,137 40,137 92% 0%
Quotas traded 62%
Notes: Countries included are EU Member States that pledged to host Syrian refugees as of April 2015; pledges refer to
the number of Syrian refugees they pledged to host as of April 2015; initial quotas are calculated by rescaling the EU
proposal on resettlement for the omission of non-pledging countries; anti-refugee sentiment calculated as population
over pledge divided by 1 million; market quota is the market allocation in this simulation given the assumptions
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The number shown in column 3 is the γrevealedi calculated as explained above and di-
vided by 1 million to make it readable.
About 62 percent of all the quotas allocated according to column 2 would be traded,
generating an overall 92 percent cost reduction with respect to the EU distribution of
quotas. By definition, the total cost would not vary with respect to the pledges from
column 1, but the distribution of costs would certainly change substantially. The mar-
ket would benefit Germany, Sweden and Austria, who would be paid by countries such
as the UK, Spain and Hungary.
In monetary terms, we can take the polar cases of Germany and the UK. Suppose
that we equate the marginal cost of the market to 10,000 euros, the per-refugee com-
pensation given by the Asylum and Migration Fund. The total cost, both under the
existing pledges and under the market, would be equal to 40,137 pledges times 10,000
euros, that is 201 million euros. Under the current system of pledges, Germany’s cost
would be equal to 150 million while the UK’s cost would be limited to 715,000 euros. If
the market were to be implemented, though, Germany would actually turn a profit of
77 million euros, while the UK’s cost would rise to 54 million.
3.3 Simulation based on Eurobarometer replies (stated preferences)
Of course, the simulation above is a very particular one. We can next assume that pref-
erences have not been revealed by the current pledges but, instead, the true preferences
of the Member States were reflected in the answers of their citizens to the Eurobarom-
eter 380 (2011) question on the appropriateness of granting asylum to people in need.
This exercise is performed in Table 2, where the taste parameter γi is no longer calcu-
lated but is taken instead as a given characteristic of each of the countries:
In this case, only a quarter of the initial distribution of quotas would be traded. The rea-
son is that the differences in preferences are not as extreme as in Table 1. The difference
between the most refugee-friendly country (Sweden) and the less refugee-friendly one
(Hungary) is less than 8 to 1, compared to 166 to 1 (Germany vs. the UK) in Table 1.
Given that there would be fewer trades, the total cost reduction with respect to the initial
EU quotas is smaller than in Table 1, just 27 percent instead of 62 percent.
The main difference would come from the comparison with the cost associated to
existing pledges. The market would imply a cost reduction of 65 percent with respect
to the voluntary pledges. The reason is that the pledges are very far from the optimal
solution implied by the market. In other words, the pledges would be very different from
Member States’ true preferences, if the true preferences are correctly reflected in the
Eurobarometer survey. The simulation is run under the assumption that countries’ true
cost corresponds to these preferences rather than to the revealed ones from Table 1.
Table 2 Simulation under stated preferences: share of people in the special Eurobarometer 380
from 2011 disagreeing with the statement: “The EU member states should offer protection and
asylum to people in need”










Austria 1,500 1,047 19 525 25% 63%
Belgium 300 1,156 27 488 33% −888%
Czech Republic 70 1,238 22 564 30% −21914%
Denmark 390 814 7 945 3% −324%
Finland 850 691 12 534 5% 37%
France 2,400 5,601 26 2,976 22% −325%
Germany 30,000 7,277 11 8,801 4% 94%
Hungary 30 724 31 377 23% −44781%
Ireland 421 641 15 361 19% −88%
Italy 450 4,691 17 4,144 1% −10617%
Luxembourg 60 347 14 45 76% −715%
Netherlands 500 1,726 19 1,042 16% −905%
Poland 100 2,269 7 6,418 335% 120790%
Portugal 93 1,660 13 952 18% −25971%
Spain 130 3,653 9 6,128 46% −42607%
Sweden 2,700 1,158 4 2,820 206% 119%
United Kingdom 143 5,445 25 3,017 20% −116062%
Total 40,137 40,137 40,137 27% 65%
Quotas traded 25%
Notes: Countries included are EU Member States that pledged to host Syrian refugees as of April 2015; pledges refer to
the number of Syrian refugees they pledged to host as of April 2015; initial quotas are calculated by rescaling the EU
proposal on resettlement for the omission of non-pledging countries; anti-refugee sentiment calculated as the share of
people in the Special Eurobarometer 380 from 2011 disagreeing with the statement: “The EU Member States should offer
protection and asylum to people in need;” market quota is the market allocation in this simulation given the assumptions
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ket equates the 10,000 per-refugee compensation from the Asylum and Migration
Fund, then the total cost of the market would still be 200 million euros as in Table 1.
As a result, we would infer the actual cost of the existing pledges to be 568 million
euros according to our simulated cost functions.
Considering again the polar cases in this simulation, the most benefitted country with
respect to the existing pledges would be Poland, which would actually earn 9 million
euros through the market. Sweden would be the only other country to turn a profit.
The reason is that residents of both countries declare to be particularly refugee-
friendly, and this translates into a low cost of hosting refugees for them. Hence, they
get paid a large sum by less refugee-friendly countries. On the opposite side, the UK
would have the largest cost increase, from 34,000 euros to 39 million euros, although
the biggest cost overall would correspond to France, with 41 million euros.3.4 General discussion
It is important to stress that the simulations above are for illustrative purpose only. We
have (nor anyone has) any definitive evidence as to what countries preferences are in
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reflecting people’s preferences) or what cost-functions they imply. Actually, only a
market-mechanism of the type we are proposing is able to reveal the true cost for
countries of hosting additional refugees—and to result in a sensible “price” that can
guide public decision-making.
Still, even though both approaches give us different results in terms of the efficiency
of the market and the final distribution of costs that it would generate, they are useful
in understanding the difficulties the EU is having in coordinating a response to the
Syrian crisis. Both approaches conclude that a majority of countries lose with respect
to an uncoordinated solution, at least given the initial distribution of quotas that has
been proposed by the European Union. There are very few countries, mostly Germany
and Sweden, that would actually benefit from a coordinated solution even if this was
globally efficient as in our simulation presented in Table 2. This suggests that the initial
distribution of quotas would need to be adjusted to make sure that all the Member
States, or at least a majority of them, benefit from the coordinated policy. This is feas-
ible as long as there are global gains, but it would require a level of information that it
is unlikely to be available.
Given these considerations, we do not advocate a full implementation of our system
to begin with. Instead, we believe our proposal should be tested on a reduced number
of refugees, and possibly member states, before scaling it up. The objective would be to
show that it actually generates substantial welfare gains both for refugees and for par-
ticipating member states. It would also allow us to elicit some useful information on
how to manipulate initial quotas so that a larger number of participating countries
benefit from the market.4 Conclusion
The Common European Asylum System had been struggling to coordinate policies
across Member States for a long time, but the refugee flights generated by the war in
Syria made its problems more apparent and their solution more urging. The current
paper takes the theoretical model developed in Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
(2014) and adapted by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015) to the coordin-
ation of the reception of refugees and asylum seekers in the European Union and goes on
to simulate how it would work in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis.
Our proposal consists of three main elements. The first one is a distribution of re-
sponsibilities across Member States according to some criterion. This issue has already
been tackled by the European Commission when launching their European Agenda on
Migration. Secondly, we argue that refugee preferences need to be taken into account
by allowing them to choose their preferred destination within the European Union as
long as there are refugee quotas available. Similarly, receiving countries preferences re-
garding refugee types could also be taken into account. We would implement this
choice through the adoption of one of the classical matching mechanisms that have
been typically used to assign students to colleges or doctors to hospitals. Thirdly, allow-
ing Member States to trade the quotas assigned by the European Commission would
ensure that refugees end up going to the countries where it is less costly or more bene-
ficial to host them.
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assumptions on the actual cost functions of countries. We take two approaches to
simulate the cost functions: a revealed preferences approach, deducing preferences
from pledges to host Syrian refugees that were made at the beginning of 2015; and
a stated preferences approach, taking average answers across countries about refu-
gee protection from Eurobarometer surveys. Of course, both simulations give rise
to very different outcomes. Nevertheless, they are helpful to understand the poten-
tial costs and benefits that such a system may have for individual countries, which
explains why some of them might be more or less in favor of coordinated solutions. We
argue that this potential variety of outcomes is a rationale for policy experiments
that would include our proposal.
As a way forward, we advocate the market component of our proposal as a solution to
the lack of flexibility of the existing EU system and of the European Agenda on Migration.
The market would allow Member States to modulate their contribution to the
CEAS in terms of reception of refugees or just financial compensations according
to their own different preferences and particular situations in different points in
time. The market does not imply that countries can shy away from their responsibility in
providing protection. It just gives them additional maneuvering space in contributing to
the general public good.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the matching mechanism ensures the protection of indi-
vidual refugee rights so that none of them are forced to relocate to an undesired destin-
ation. Moreover, the opportunity to express preferences offers additional opportunities to
increase efficiency for both refugees and receiving countries, which can be used either to




3The mechanism is conceived in such a way that it is “incentive compatible;” that is,
it generates a truthful revelation of preferences, both of the migrants (refugees) and the
countries.
4This feature is not specifically considered in our paper but can be easily incorporated.
For example, Roth (2002) explains how classical matching mechanisms can be modified
to take into account the assignment of couples to residency positions in the US.
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